Elena Komleva
The institute of philosophy, Dortmund University, Germany

The power interests of Germany in the European North of Russia are concentrated around Stockman field and the long-term storage facilities of the nuclear data.

In the prospect the nuclear storage will be changed into the burial. Germany is a suitable partner in the Arctic because it doesn’t pretend for its sector there. It is expected to build the pipelines “The Barents sea – Vyborg” and the “Nord Stream” of “Gazprom” company. 

New principles and documents relative to interrelations between European Union and Russia are being formed nowadays, including power engineering field. Russia accounts its rejection of ratification of EU power charter for the losses in the oil and gas field and for the weak representation of a nuclear fuel on the European market when the world is surviving its nuclear “renascence”. It’s enough to remember the appeal of the ministers of the “G-8” in charge for the power field (Moscow, 2006) to a fast development of atom.

Germany is cautions about its own nuclear plans. But it can’t ignore in its power policy some different strong tendencies. One must esteem its decisions in special nuclear issues. But invariable policy doesn’t exist. And Germany can’t avoid the assessment of calls and prospects in the nuclear field, which are real now and are prolonged in the future. Germany is the main consumer and the future distributor of the Russian gas in Europe. And this is very important owing to the closing of the nuclear power stations and the coalmines in the country by so called “power nationalism” in European Union.

Nuclear energy of Barents region can influence on gas production and transportation. And the presence of gas itself will influence on the nuclear situation. Does “Gazprom” and Germany need the nuclear neighbors? Should they hold away from them or control them with the benefit for themselves?

“Gazprom” which has foreign political and economic function, power diversification and to which the “Atomstroiexport” belongs for 49 percent. Did “Gazprom” consider the nuclear factors? The presence of a nuclear weapon and radioactive wastes, the transportation of the debugged fuel of Northern Fleet and Kola nuclear power station by the sea and by the rail. The interest of definite forces to the ill-intentioned tranceboundary shift of radioactivity. Gas is a good transmitter of dirt. Nowdays the unauthorized inset in the pipelines is a trifling matter. But on the other hand nuclear generation of energy helps to develop the North and gas resources. Adaptability of nuclear energy will be determined after the solution of the problem of nuclear waste products. What social and political conditions should be in the region? Allocation of the infrastructure? And does only gas infrastructure?

Flourishing Finland is dreaming about the admission of Norwegian and Russian gas through its territory. And Norway which is not less prosperous is expected to build a trunk line to Great Britain for its arctic gas but it is ready to use Russian pipeline so that half of the Russian gas meant for liquation on the hypothetical “Gasprom’s” plant comes in to the plant in Hammerfest. Won’t the construction of two gas pipelines and two plants for liquation of gas be costly for the eastern Arctic?

“Gasprom” will be in beneficial political position on the continental Europe and get a chance for construction of new energetic “routes” if it for example combines its efforts with French “Total” and new Norwegian company. It will immediately gain an access to missing technologies, finances and productive capacities and also to the western market and stable prices on gas. Taking into consideration the history of the Baltic and the Russian terrorism it’s much easier and safer to get to Germany through Norway, Sweden or Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia than through Vyborg.

Germans stipulate for all potential dangers before providing Europe with the Barents sea gas. The context of the radiological weapon and the radiation accidents is already fixed in the name of Russian-German agreement 2003 on “Rendering collaboration in elimination of the nuclear weapon reduced by Russian Federation by utilization of the atomic submarines removed from the Russian Navy within the limits of the agreement about global partnership against spread of mass annihilation weapons.”

Definite authorities discredit the security, dependability in the long-term partnership and clarity of the technologies and business with reference to the Russian energetic objects. They encourage EU and NATO to “guard” the energetic infrastructure of Russia and to interfere in its work. It may be worth thinking with the help of “Gazprom” about the hypothesis of international nuclear storage functioning on the boundary territory of north-eastern Russia using marine communications and the ports like Kirkenes, Linahamary, Pechenga or Kemy? Or the hypothesis about storage on a special so called “socialized” territory, which consists commonly of insignificant investments? There will be no need to go “far away” “protecting”. Or as well the hypothesis about existence of one, “middle” gas-main pipeline on the territory of Norway, Finland or/and Sweden? So that gas and nuclear objects do not impede each other. So, Europe and Russia would have the alternatives to strive for through the discussions and to demonstrate advantages and disadvantages of these variants in respect of the dangers.

Russia is planning to construct several large international long-term nuclear storages or the storages of “perpetual” function (for hundreds and thousands years). The new priorities of the nuclear storage problem will be safety and security. Because the storages contain materials for classic and radiologic types of nuclear weapons for military or terrorist purposes. The cost of “perpetual” underground storage may be similar to the American analogue “Yucca Mountain” (60 billion dollars). The construction of these “giants” in Russia with the help of western investments was discussed in Moscow within the international conferences under the aegis of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “Handling of irradiated fuel: new russian initiatives 2002” and “Multilateral technical and organizational approaches to the cycles of nuclear fuel to avoid its spread 2005”. And during the visit of IAEA general manager (2005) and the USA president.(2006).

Preliminary natural-science, technical and humanitarian research in the context of long-term storage of nuclear materials and the integrated potential of the European North lead to the SAMPO project hypothesis: Scandinavian (Slavic) Atomic Mission - the Proliferation’s Oikumene. Hypothesis is about creation of an international underground nuclear storage in the near field of Norway, Finland and Sweden, on the territory of Pechenga region of Murmansk oblast, close to Trifonov Pechengskiy monastery and the temple of Saint Boris and Gleb, on the territory of the “Norilsk nikel” factory and Kola superdeep well out of the oil and gas infrastructure of the region. According to the geologic-geochemical production and economic factors this type of storage is similar to those underground places for nuclear storage offered by Russia (“Majak” and Priargunsk mining and chemical association).

The SAMPO project also brings positive potential of religious, mythological, spiritual and humanitarian associations. It is a potential of some mystery thinking about which the mankind grows wiser. I will give some examples.

Small and united nation Saami (Lopari) live on the polar territories of Sweden, Norway, Finland and the eastern Russia. The mineral loparite got its name from this nation. Kola region is the best place of rare minerals such as titanium, columbium, tantalum and thorium. These are the basic elements of the present and future power engineering according to the scheme of nuclear fission. The eudialyte mineral is the best natural absorbent of neutrons and an isolator of nuclear fuel in the region (its regional name is “Lappish blood”). In the Saami’s natural habitat of ancient culture as if already joint to so called “nuclear chosen” will may be created an international nuclear storage “Pechenga”. It is better to borrow their traditional knowledge and their attitude to life and nature.

The Mistress has its own place in the inner world of people. But this image helps to comprehend the phenomenon of nuclear energy from a religious side. It may be possible to touch upon the highest spiritual potential of the basic christian symbols. Foe example Saint apostle Peter and the caves. On the one hand St.Apostle Peter was a fisherman. But on the other hand St.Apostle Peter was a stumbling-block to the evil forces. It is impossible for the former fisherman who has gained together with christianity strength of the ground to be indifferent to Murman, Scandinavia and the whole world. “Pechenga hermitage” may become the analogue of religiously-nuclear Sarov and Sergiev Posad but on the new basis of spiritual and humanitarian experience. On the principles of the international cooperation but not confrontation.

It is possible to place the nuclear conversion materials which is the source of fuel of the future on the territory of the “ Majak” close to the boundary and almost Asiatic Chelyabinsk. It is also possible to put there highly radioactive wastes and debugged fuel from all over the country. Or to plan the storage of the debugged fuel near the Asiatic Krasnoyarsk because Chinese or Moslem future of Siberia is cloudy. And isn’t it possible to keep them in “Pechenga” which has opposite and more secure situation? Out of the center of refining fuel which is the source of its spread. And taking into account already known geopolitical, cultural, scientific and technical, ecological advantages and disadvantages of different regions.

Germany is reconsidering its strategy of nuclear waste isolation. A change from three to one more safety storage is being propagandized. The place of it isn’t known yet. Such attention is motivated by existence of highly radioactive and long-life waste products and debugged fuel, which is not subjected to refinement. The example is governmental work group suggestions on the research problems of the burial place (Arbeitskreis Auswahlverfahren Endlagerstandorte, 2002).

Do the German waste products “wait” for the storage place in Pechenga? Isn’t it a version of “German non-proliferation” taking into consideration the international tendencies and relations between Russia and Germany in energy field? The reactors of former GDR are making it moderator in nuclear affairs between Russia and the East. They also give right to Germany to start study SAMPO hypothesis together with Russia, the USA, the country from former USSR, the Ukraine, Baltic States, Byelorussia, Norway, Finland and Sweden.

Radioactive product wastes and the uranium of GDR reactors were delivered from Germany to Russia in 2006. The USA paid expenses. The Germans didn’t protest. That was the beginning of cooperation between Russia, Germany and the USA in the field of debugged nuclear materials and their non-proliferation. Moreover, Urenco Deutschland GmbH had sent so called “uranic tails” to Russia. The SAMPO project is another step.

The eastern nuclear power stations in Germany are close to decommissioning. Where will the remains be committed to the earth? It is difficult to do in the center of Europe with its high density of population and infrastructure. Germany has built reactors storage in Saida-Guba on Murman with potentiality of its expansion. Will the attitude of Germany and Europe towards nuclear energy become more positive if the Europeans under the SAMPO project deal with more dangerous radioactive waste products? And for Russia this is a chance to patch its radio-ecological holes.

Germany has advanced power engineering under secure energy policy, caution and care towards nuclear energy and radioactive waste products. It can create intellectually-pragmatic and administrative “net of the nets” on the national and the international levels in order to search for the ways of solving difficult scientific, economic, financial and political problems which can arise because of civil and military use of nuclear and other types of energy.
Germany may become a leader in Europe if present European constitution happens. A. Merkel is struggling for which. She is a strong politician in the time of elite change. Or a leader of a significant part of Europe, the coalition “North-Baltic Europe” for example. And to provide consolidated west-European presence here on Polar region. MAGATE is celebrated 55 years in 2007, 50 years of the union of Europe, Germany presided in EU and “G8”, EU energy summit and Berlin Declaration, 10 years to the ideas of Barents region and EU program “Northern Dimension”, an International Polar Year. And also creation of National Arctic Council in Russia together with demonstration of arctic interests of Denmark, the USA and Canada.

The Industrial NORTH #3